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A Markov perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium concept in game theory. It is the refinement of the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium to extensive form games for which a pay-off relevant state space can be readily identified. The term appeared in publications starting about 1988 in the work of economists Jean Tirole and Eric Maskin.〔Tirole (1988) and Maskin and Tirole (1988)〕 It has since been used, among else, in the analysis of industrial organization, macroeconomics and political economy. == Definition == In extensive form games, and specifically in stochastic games, a Markov perfect equilibrium is a set of mixed strategies for each of the players which satisfy the following criteria: * The strategies have the Markov property of memorylessness, meaning that each player's mixed strategy can be conditioned only on the ''state'' of the game. These strategies are called ''Markov reaction functions''. * The ''state'' can only encode payoff-relevant information. This rules out strategies that depend on non-substantive moves by the opponent. It excludes strategies that depend on signals, negotiation, or cooperation between the players (e.g. cheap talk or contracts). * The strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.〔''We shall define a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) to be a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all players use Markov strategies.'' Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole. 2001. (Markov Perfect Equilibrium ). ''Journal of Economic Theory'' 100, 191-219. , available online at http://www.idealibrary.com〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Markov perfect equilibrium」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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